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package Crypt::Perl::ECDSA; |
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use strict; |
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use warnings; |
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=encoding utf-8 |
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=head1 NAME |
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Crypt::Perl::ECDSA - Elliptic curve cryptography in pure Perl |
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=head1 SYNOPSIS |
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my $pub_key1 = Crypt::Perl::ECDSA::Parse::public($pem_or_der); |
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my $prv_key1 = Crypt::Perl::ECDSA::Parse::private($pem_or_der); |
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#---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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my $prkey_by_name = Crypt::Perl::ECDSA::Generate::by_curve_name('secp521r1'); |
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#Probably only useful for trying out a custom curve? |
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my $prkey_by_curve = Crypt::Perl::ECDSA::Generate::by_explicit_curve( |
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{ |
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p => ..., #isa Crypt::Perl::BigInt |
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a => ..., #isa Crypt::Perl::BigInt |
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b => ..., #isa Crypt::Perl::BigInt |
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n => ..., #isa Crypt::Perl::BigInt |
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# Supposedly this can be deduced from the above, but I don’t |
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# see the math for this around. It’s not in libtomcryt, AFAICT. |
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# It may have to do with Schoof’s Algorithm? |
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h => ..., #isa Crypt::Perl::BigInt |
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gx => ..., #isa Crypt::Perl::BigInt |
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gy => ..., #isa Crypt::Perl::BigInt |
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}, |
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); |
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#---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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my $msg = 'My message'; |
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# Deterministic signatures. This is probably the way to go |
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# for normal use cases. You can use sha1, sha224, sha256, sha384, |
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# or sha512. |
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my $det_sig = $private->sign_sha256($msg); |
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my $msg_hash = Digest::SHA::sha256($msg); |
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# NB: This verifies a *digest*, not the original message. |
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die 'Wut' if !$public->verify($msg_hash, $sig); |
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die 'Wut' if !$private->verify($msg_hash, $sig); |
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# Signature in JSON Web Algorithm format (deterministic): |
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my $jwa_sig = $private->sign_jwa($msg); |
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# You can also create non-deterministic signatures. These risk a |
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# security compromise if there is any flaw in the underlying CSPRNG. |
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# Note that this signs a *digest*, not the message itself. |
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my $sig = $private->sign($msg_hash); |
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#---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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$key->to_der_with_curve_name(); |
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$key->to_der_with_curve_name( compressed => 1 ); |
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$key->to_pem_with_curve_name(); |
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$key->to_pem_with_curve_name( compressed => 1 ); |
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$key->to_der_with_explicit_curve(); |
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$key->to_der_with_explicit_curve( seed => 1 ); |
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$key->to_der_with_explicit_curve( compressed => 1 ); |
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$key->to_der_with_explicit_curve( seed => 1, compressed => 1 ); |
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$key->to_pem_with_explicit_curve(); |
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$key->to_pem_with_explicit_curve( seed => 1 ); |
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$key->to_pem_with_explicit_curve( compressed => 1 ); |
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$key->to_pem_with_explicit_curve( seed => 1, compressed => 1 ); |
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=head1 DISCUSSION |
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See the documentation for L and |
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L for discussions of what these interfaces |
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can do. |
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=head1 SECURITY |
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86
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The security advantages of elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) are a matter of |
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some controversy. While the math itself is apparently bulletproof, there are |
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varying opinions about the integrity of the various curves that are recommended |
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for ECC. Some believe that some curves contain backdoors that would allow |
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L to sniff a transmission. For more information, |
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look at L. |
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That said, RSA will eventually no longer be viable: as RSA keys get bigger, the |
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security advantage of increasing their size diminishes. |
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C “has no opinion” regarding which curves you use; it ships all |
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of the prime-field curves that (L) includes and |
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works with any of them. You can try out custom curves as well. |
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=head2 Deterministic Signatures |
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102
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This library can create deterministic signatures, as per |
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L. Read that RFC’s |
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introduction to learn why this is a good idea. |
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106
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=head1 FORMATS SUPPORTED |
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108
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Elliptic-curve keys can be in a variety of formats. This library supports |
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almost all of them: |
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=over |
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113
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=item Parse and export of named curves and explicit curves. (See below |
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about explicit curve parameters.) |
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116
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=item Parse and export of curve points in compressed or uncompressed form, |
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and parse of points in hybrid form. |
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(NB: L |
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prohibits use of the hybrid form.) |
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121
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=back |
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Explicit curves (i.e., giving the curve by full parameters rather than by |
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name reference) may be a known curve or an arbitrary curve. |
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Explicit curves may include or omit the seed value. It is omitted in output |
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by default. Explicit curves may also include or |
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omit the cofactor, but if the curve is unknown the cofactor is required. |
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This is because this library’s export of explicit curves always includes the |
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cofactor. While it’s not required for ECDSA, it’s recommended, and it’s |
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required for ECDH. Moreover, unlike the seed (which nither ECDSA nor ECDH |
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requires), the cofactor is small enough that its inclusion only enlarges the |
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key by a few bytes. |
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I believe the cofactor can be deduced from the other curve parameters; |
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if someone wants to submit a PR to do this that would be nice. |
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137
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Generator/base points will be exported as compressed or uncompressed |
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according to the public point. If for some reason you really need a |
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compressed base point but an uncompressed public point or vice-versa, |
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and you need this library to do it for you, |
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please explain your need for such a thing in your pull request. :-) |
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143
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=head1 TODO |
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145
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Functionality can be augmented as feature requests come in. |
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Patches are welcome—particularly with tests! |
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148
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In particular, it would be great to support characteristic-two curves, |
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though almost everything seems to expect the prime-field variety. |
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(OpenSSL is the only implementation I know of that |
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supports characteristic-two.) |
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153
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It would also be nice to have logic that deduces the cofactor from the |
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other curve parameters. |
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156
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=head1 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS |
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158
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Most of the ECDSA logic here is ported from Kenji Urushima’s |
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L. |
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Curve data is copied from OpenSSL. (See the script included in the |
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distribution.) |
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The point decompression logic is ported from L. |
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166
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Deterministic ECDSA logic derived in part from |
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L. |
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=cut |
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171
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1; |